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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No. 16609

RODNEY K. STARKS,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant was charged with Criminal Homicide,
Murder in the Second Degree, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§

76-5-203

(1953), as amended.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty

of Criminal Homicide, Manslaughter, a lesser included offense,
on June 27, 1979, in the Third Judicial District Court, the
Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., presiding.

The trial court

sentenced appellant to an indeterminate term of one to fifteen
years in the Utah State Prison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the judgment of the jury at trial and the sentence of the
trial court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the evening of September 29, 1978, appellant
Rodney K. Starks arranged with Kaylene Griggs to have her
permanent wave his hair

(R. 159).

Starks had become friends

with Ms. Griggs when they worked together at Kim's Massage
Parlor

(R. 15 7) .

Starks agreed to pick up Ms. Griggs after

she completed her shift as a dancer at the Golden Fleece Bar

I

located in the area of 250 West and 3300 South (R. 160). Whe:
appellant arrived at the bar he called Kaylene from a telepho:
in the Touch of Class Massage Parlor located on the lower fk
of the same building (R. 159).

Ms. Griggs testified that she
I

told appellant that Joe Boykin, her ex-boyfriend, was in the
bar bothering her and asked Starks if he would come upsUin
to wait by the door for her

(R. 160).

1

When Starks left the

bar with Ms. Griggs, Boykin followed them outside into the
parking lot

(R. 161) and over to a vehicle Starks had borrowe;

from his employer Al Cortez

(R. 163).

As Ms. Griggs was seated in the car with the passW
door open, Boykin grabbed her arm, removed her from the car,
and pulled his fist back as if he were going to hit her.

st··' I

pushed Boykin away and attempted to calm him (R. 165-166) · '''
Griggs testified that Starks told Boykin "if he wanted to :cSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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1

to [her)

to talk to [her) on his own time, that right now

[she) was on his time .

.

" (R. 166).

When Boykin asked

if Starks was Ms. Grigg~ "old man," he told Boykin that he
was not and added, "[I)f I was I would treat her alot better
than you have."

(R. 166).

As Ms. Griggs turned her back on

Starks and Boykin to place her personal articles in the car,
she heard a shot (R. 167).

When she turned back, both men

were running toward the end of the parking lot (R. 167).
Ms. Griggs returned to the bar and called the police (R. 169).
During the interval before the shooting, Peter
Isaacson, owner of the Touch of Class Massage Parlor, arrived
in the parking lot (R. 240).

Isaacson testified that it was

growing dark when he arrived, and Boykin, Ms. Griggs and Starks
were standing near the passenger side of Al Cortez' car (R. 241).
Isaacson walked over to the car to say hello, whereupon Boykin
became upset with him (R. 242-244).
it would be best if he left

(R. 244).

Appellant told Isaacson
Isaacson walked away,

but turned and looked back toward the car before he reached
the building (R. 245).

He then say Boykin grab Ms. Griggs'

arm and saw Starks remove Boykin's hand (R. 245-246).

He

testified that Boykin backed off as if he wanted to fight (R. 247).
He heard shots as appellant and Boykin stood seven to eight
feet apart facing each other (R. 247-249).

Isaacson saw both

men run toward the street with Boykin running ahead of Starks,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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and he heard three more shots

(R.

250).

Isaacson

follow~

Starks and Boykin up 3300 South toward the railroad tracks
where he saw Boykin fall

(R.

252).

Starks returned to the

car then began walking north of 3300 South

(R. 253).

I

When Officer Vaughn of the Salt Lake County Sheriff 1

Department arrived at the scene, the victim was lying in the •
middle of 3300 South about 400 yards from the Golden Fleece
Bar

(R.

wounds.

141).

Boykin subsequently died from multiple gunshoti

Dr. Serge Moore of the State Medical Examiner's Off::

testified that the ultimate cause of death was a gunshot whit
entered the left thigh and severed the femoral artery which
carries blood to the legs

(R. 207).

In support of appellant's claim that he shot Boykir.
in self-defense, appellant's counsel introduced evidence
illustrating the violent propensities of the victim.

On cro:o

examination, Kaylene Griggs testified that one evening while
she was having dinner with Starks and Al Cortez, Boykin enten
the restaurant and asked her to step outside where he assault:
her

(R.

174-175).

She also testified that she told appellant

about an incident when Boykin pretended to have a gun in his
pocket to frighten two men
Boykin had raped her

(R.

178), and also told him that

(R. 176).

Appellant testified that his contacts with the
·

deceased generally involve d keeping

-4-
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Massage Parlor (R. 296).

Starks further testified about the

incident in the restaurant (R. 297) and acknowledged that Ms.
Griggs told him about the alleged rape (R. 303-304) and the
incident in which Boykin pretended to have a gun (R. 304).
Starks admitted that when he pulled into the parking lot of
the Golden Fleece bar, he recognized Boykin's car, removed a
pistol which he was aware was under the seat of Al Cortez'
automobile and placed it in his pocket (R. 311-312).

Appellant

said he knew the gun was loaded but was not certain how to
operate it (R.

312).

Starks claimed to have shot Boykin

because he believed he was reaching into his pocket for a
gun (R.

323-325) and that he continued to shoot to assure the

deceased would not return to the parking lot (R. 328).
At the trial, the jury was instructed in the elements
of Second Degree Murder

(R. 87), Manslaughter (R. 89-90),

and self-defense (R. 94-96).

Appellant requested an instruction

directing the jury to consider evidence of the deceased's
character (R. 72) and requested an instruction on reasonable
alternative hypothesis

(R. 52-53).

Both requests were denied.

POINT I
THE INSTRUCTION ON THE LIMITATION OF
SELF-DEFENSE TO NON-AGRESSORS WAS
PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY.
The trial court instructed the jury in the present
case as to the elements of criminal homicide, instruction
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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number 14
15

(R.

(R. 86) , second degree murder, instruction number

87), and the lesser included offense of Manslaughter

'I

instruction numbers 17, 18 and 19

(R. 89, 90, 91).

The jury

was further instructed as to the requisite intent necessary

to be guilty of the above-noted offenses in instruction nurnbe:
16

(R.

88), and the appellant's theory of self-defense was

explained in instruction numbers 22, 23 and 24 (R. 94, 95, 1!
As a part of its instructions on self-defense, the Court guw

!

portions of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402

(1953), as amended.

Instruction number 22 reads:

1.
A person is justified in threatening
or using force against another when and to
the extent that he reasonably believes that
such force is necessary to defend himself
or a third person against such other's
imminent use of unlawful force; however, a
person is justified in using force which is
intended or likely to cause death or serious
bodily injury only if he reasonably believes
that the force is necessary to prevent death
or serious bodily injury to himself or a
third person, or to prevent the commission
of a forcible felony.
2.
A person is not justified in using force
under the circumstances specified in paragraph one of this section if he:
(a)
Was the aggressor or was engaged
in a combat by agreement, unless he
withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to such other pers?n
his intent to do so and the other notw1~h
standing continues or threatens to conti~e
the use of unlawful force.
Appellant contends that it was prejudicial error:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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include the language in section 2(a) of the above instruction,
claiming that there was no evidence to support submission of
this instruction on the limitation of self-defense to nonaggressors.

Respondent submits that there was substantial

evidence to support submission of this instruction and, in
the alternative, even if the language relating to agression
had been inapplicable, there was no error in framing this
instruction in the statutory language.
This Court has previously approved the practice of
giving jury instructions substantially equivalent to the
statutory language.
(Utah 1976)

See:

State v. Schoenfeld, 545 P.2d 193

(self-defense instruction substantially in the

language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (1953), is proper),
and State v. Hughes, 24 Utah 2d 235, 469 P.2d 235 (1970)
(voluntary manslaughter instructions substantially in the
language of the statute are proper).
Utah 2d 98, 493 P.2d 617

(1972)

Cf: State v. Murphy, 27

(instruction in form of

statute is permissible), and State v. Gallegos, 16 Utah 2d
102, 396 P.2d 414

(1964)

(giving instructions in the words of

the statute is not erroneous).
The standard given by this Court for determining
whether statutory language is appropriate for jury instructions
is whether the instruction " is supported by a reasonable
interpretation of the evidence."

State v. Minnish, 560 P.2d

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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340, 341

(Utah 1977).

In the present case there was ample

evidence to give rise to a jury question whether appellant
was an aggressor, and the instruction was thus proper.
Appellant cites the definition of "aggressor"
approved by this Court in State v. Schoenfeld, 545 P.2d 19J
(Utah 1976), contending that the facts of the present case
do not satisfy that definition.

The trial court in that

case instructed the jury that,
An aggressor is one who willingly and
knowingly initially provokes a combat
or does acts of such a nature as would
ordinarily lead to combat.
A person can
also be classified as an aggressor if he
leaves the scene of a quarrel, arms himself and then returns to the scene and
renews the quarrel.
545 P.2d at 196.

(Emphasis added.)

Applying this definition to the facts of the prese:
case, there is sufficient evidence to support submission of
the instruction on aggression to the jury.

Several incident

testified to at trial indicate that appellant did "acts of
such a nature as would ordinarily lead to combat."

The evi·

dence established that appellant had notice of the violent
character of Boykin.
by Ms. Griggs

Appellant's knowledge was testified tc

(R. 174-176, 178) and appellant himself

300, 303, 304).

(R.l~

When appellant arrived at the Golden fleece

Bar, he noticed Boykin' s car in the parking lot and armed
himself for a possible confrontation (R.

311-312).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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He adn:

that rather than taking action to avoid the confrontation,
he "marched" into the Golden Fleece Bar "like a man.
335-336).

11

(R.

Appellant clearly expected and was prepared for

a confrontation and took no steps to avoid it.

Finally,

the discussion which took place shortly before the shooting
clearly shows that appellant was the aggressor.

Rather than

acting as the peace-maker depicted in appellant's statement
of facts (Appellant's Brief p.5), Starks made statements to
Boykin which clearly added to the conflict.

Ms. Griggs

testified to the following conversation between the appellant
and Boykin which took place shortly before the shooting:
Sammy told him that I didn't want to
talk to him and if he wanted to talk
to me to talk to me on his own time
that right now, I was on his time and
Joe said well, is this your old man,
now, and Sammy said, no, I am not her
old man but, if I was I would treat
her a lot better than you have. (R. 166).

I

During cross-examination, the appellant admitted that

I

I

while he could not remember the exact nature of this conversation,
he had tried "to sound confident . . . because [he) didn't
want to sound weak or scared . . . 11 (R. 336).

Clearly, the

conversation was not as conciliatory as the appellant would
have this Court believe, and Starks' statements to the deceased
clearly fall within the definition of "acts of a nature which
would ordinarily lead to combat" under the circumstances of
this case.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Under the test delineated by this court in

~

v. Minnish, supra, the issue of whether appellant was an
aggressor in the confrontation with the deceased was proper!:
submitted to the jury since the disputed instruction was
clearly "supported by a reasonable interpretation of the ev'.·
dence."

560 P.2d at 341.

Similarly, submission of the

instruction on aggression was proper under the principles
noted in State v. Turner, 79 P.2d 46
appellant.

(Utah 1938),

cited~

Although concluding that the evidence did not

support a finding that the deceased attacked the appellant,
this court observed that it should be left to the jury to
determine whether or not the defendant was the aggressor.
This court stated:
. it was pre-eminently a jury
question whether, under the circumstances, [the deceased's] conduct
was sufficiently menacing to create
in the mind of the defendant as a
reasonable man an honest belief that
the danger to him was imminent and
that his action in shooting was
honestly to protect himself from
loss of life or great bodily harm.
79 P.2d at 52.
Similarly, it was a jury question in the present case whethe:
appellant was the aggressor in the confrontation.
Even if the language dealing with the limitation:
self-defense to non-aggressors

were shown to be inapplicabl'

·
t ·
was
in the present case, submission of this instruc ion
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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r,··

J

prejudicial error.

This court reviewed a situation where

portions of statutory language in a self-defense instruction
were inapplicable in the case of State v. Schoenfeld, 545
P.2d 193

(Utah 1976).

In that case the defendant, who was

convicted of negligent homicide, assigned as error the trial
court's instruction, in the language of Utah Code Ann.

§

76-2-402

(1953), as amended, that one who "is committing, or is fleeing
after the commission or attempted commission of a felony"
may

not claim self-defense.

545 P.2d at 196.

Appellant's

claim of error was based upon the fact that his conduct
toward the deceased would not have necessarily constituted
a felony, but may have been a misdemeanor only.

In response,

this Court stated:
The instructions are stated in abstract
generality; and they do not purport to
tell the jury either what the evidence
is or what the facts are . . .
[T]his paragraph is stating an exception:
that is, when "a person is not justified
in using force." This telling the jury
that a person in defendant's circumstances
is deprived of that defense if he is
attempting to commit a felony has the
effect of saying that defendant would not
be deprived of the defense unless his
conduct was an offense of the higher
order; i.e.
a felony, but would leave
him with the defense if his conduct were
only a misdemeanor.
. ~t should.be
obvious that requiring the Jury to find
his conduct to be of the higher order
before depriving him of self-defense could
not have been prejudicial to the defendant
under the circumstances.
545 P.2d at 197.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Clearly, even if there had been no

evidence~~

the appellant acted as an aggressor in the present case,
there would be no prejudicial error in an instruction which
merely stated an exception requiring the jury to find evidence of aggression to deny appellant's claimed defense.
Furthermore, the jury was specifically instructed that, "If
an instruction applies only to a state of facts which you
find does not exist, you will disregard the instruction."
(R.

100)

Such an instruction is necessary whenever the

evidence at trial is susceptible to several interpretations.
In the present case, the jury was

instructed~

the elements of Second Degree Murder, Manslaughter and
Homicide justified as self-defense.

Accordingly, the

applicability of individual instructions depended upon the
determination of facts by the jury.

In this case the fact

that an instruction would not apply to a particular factual
determination would clearly not constitute prejudicial error
Appellant cites numerous cases from neighboring
jurisdictions involving factual situations where instructior'

on the limitation of self-defense to non-aggressors have
been found either applicable or inapplicable by the courts.
; I

Respondent submits that these cases all stand for the gener,.
principle that there must be sufficient evidence to support
the legal theory behind an instruction before it is
to the jury.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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su~iW

Jury instructions should not be construed as
comments upon the evidence for the sake of claiming error
in their admission.
197

(Utah 1976).

State v. Schoenfeld, 545 P.2d 193,

The disputed instruction in the present

case was properly submitted to the jury as reflecting one
possible interpretation of the evidence which the jury chose
to accept in returning a verdict of Manslaughter.

However,

even if the instruction were found to be inapplicable,
submission of this instruction would not be reversible error.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED
APPELLANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION CONCERNING VIOLENT ACTS OF THE
DECEASED.
At trial, evidence of the violent propensities
of the victim, and appellant's knowledge of past violent
acts of the deceased was admitted in support of appellant' s claim he acted in self-defense.

This is in accord

with the general rule that when a defendant claims to have
acted in self-defense, evidence of the deceased's character may be admitted for purpose of assessing the reason-

1

I

ableness of the defendant's apprehension of imminent
bodily harm.

State v. Minnish, 560 P.2d 340 (Utah 1977).

In the present case, appellant contends the trial court
erred in refusing his proposed instruction which provided:
You are instructed that all evidence
known to RODNEY K. STARKS, on
September 29, 1978, concerning the reputation and specific acts of violence and aggressiveness of Joseph
L. Boykin is relevant to your determination of Rodney K. Starks'
state of mind and the reasonableness
of his conduct at the time of this
incident.
On the basis of this evidence, considered in conjunction with the
rest of the evidence in this case, if
you find that there is a reasonable
doubt that Rodney K. Starks committed
the offense, then you must find Rodney
K. Starks not guilty.
(R. 72)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Respondent claims that there was no error in denying this
instruction since the instructions actually given the jury
were an adequate depiction of the defense of self-defense
and clearly allowed the jury to consider the character of
the deceased in assessing appellant's claim.
The trial court gave four separate jury instructions on aspects of appellant's self-defense claim.
Instruction number 22, discussed under the preceding
point, included the statutory provisions of self-defense
delineated by Utah Code Ann.
amended. (R. 94)

§

76-2-402 (1953), as

Instruction number 23 stated that the

defendant claiming self-defense is required to present
some substantial evidence which would raise a reasonable
doubt as to the defendant's guilt or whether or not defendant acted in self-defense. (R. 95)

Finally, the trial

court's instruction number 25 particularly bears upon appellant's second claim of error.

This instruction reads,

in part:
You are instructed that actual danger
is not necessary to establish selfdefense. If one is confronted by
the appearance of peril which arouses
in his mind, as a reasonable person,
an honest conviction that he is about
to suffer death or serious bodily
injury and if a reasonable person in a
like situation, seeing and knowing the
same facts, would be justified in

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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believing himself in danger, his right
to self defense is the same whether
such danger is real or merely
apparent.
(Emphasis added.) (R. 97)
This instruction requested the jury to judge appellant's belief that he would suffer death or serious
bodily injury at the hands of Joe Boykin from appellant's
perspective, "seeing and knowing the same facts."

These

facts included appellant's knowledge of Boykin• s character
and prior violent acts.

Therefore, the jury was

instru~

ted to consider the reasonableness of appellant's apprehension given his knowledge of the deceased' s character.
Once the trial court had correctly instructed
the jury in the law applicable to self-defense, refusal to
give the defendant's requested instruction was not error.
People v. Callaghan, 4 Utah 49, 6 P. 49 ( 1885).

Respond-

ent submits that the instructions given by the trial court
correctly and completely covered the area of self-defense.
The jury was charged in clear and concise language that
they were to evaluate appellant's actions from the
standpoint of a reasonable man in appellant's position a~c
possessing appellant's knowledge.
posed instructions,

Furthermore, the~~

if given, could have encouraged the

jury to lose sight of the fact that it is the threat of
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_.....I

imminent death or bodily harm which determines whether
self-defense is available and appellant would not be
justified in using deadly force simply based upon his past
experience or encounters with the deceased.
Appellant again cites several cases from other
jurisdictions in support of his contention that his requested instruction should have been given to the jury.
Respondent submits that the court's refusal to give the
instruction was consistent with principles announced in
those cases.
Appellant cites the case of State v. Bush, 148
Cal. Rptr. 430 (1978) in support of the contention that
failure to give a specific instruction dealing with evidence of the deceased's violent character is reversible
error.

However, in the Bush case, the trial court's

instructions were found to unduly emphasize the fear of
"imminent" or "present" danger, leading the appellate
court to conclude the jury may have been diverted from
adequately considering the evidence of prior threats made
by the deceased to the defendant.

In contrast, the jury

instructions in the present case charged the jury unequivocally to judge the reasonableness of the appellant's
self-defense claims from the standpoint of "a reasonable
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person in a like situation, seeing and knowing the same
facts."

In addition, the jury was cautioned that even if

it should later "appear that there was no actual danger~
there was only slight actual danger, that fact would not
affect the right of self-defense if the appearances es~~
lishing that right existed."
Second, appellant relies upon the Oklahoma case:
of Rice v. State, 567 P.2d 525 (Okla. 1977), and Ramseyv.
State, 558 P.2d 1179 (Okla. 1977).

In Rice v. State, the

court stated that where the instructions given at trial
"fairly and accurately state the law they will be deemed
sufficient."

558 P.2d at 530.

Thus, the court found no

error in refusing the defendant's requested instructioo
when its substance was contained in instructions actually
given.

In the Ramsey case, the court added that the

admission of evidence of prior threats "does not in and oi
itself necessitate a special instruction," concluding that
the jury would have no difficulty in applying the general
self-defense instructions given by the court to the facts
of the case.

558 P.2d at 1183.

Thus, the Oklahomapos1·

tion is that failure to give an instruction on considera·
tion of the deceased' s character is not error where the
instructions given fairly and accurately state the law.
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Similarly, the North Carolina cases of State v.
Hall, 228 S.E.2d 637 (1976), and State v. Rummage, 185
S.E.2d 221 (1971), cited by appellant support general
principles applicable to the present case.

While the

court in State v. Hall found it was error to omit instructions corelating evidence that the deceased was a violent
man, the court cited the earlier case of State v. Rummage
in support of the proposition that this error alone would
not call for reversal.

In a passage from the Rummage

opinion quoted in State v. Hall, the North Carolina Court
of Appeals stated:
[We] are reluctant to hold that this
error, standing alone, constituted reversible error, since the trial judge
had otherwise fully charged on selfdefense.
185 S.E. at 224.

Thus even in a jurisdiction where

failure to give an instruction concerning the deceased's
character has been found to be error, it has not constituted reversible error standing alone.
The instructions on self-defense given in the
present case embody the substance of Utah law.

Therefore,

there was no error in refusing to give appellant's requested instruction.

Furthermore, instruction number 25

(R.97), discussed at length above, charged the jury that
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•
they were to consider appellant's claim from the viewpoint
of one "seeing and knowing the same facts."

This instruc-

tion clearly allowed the jury to consider appellant's
knowledge of Boykin's violent tendencies.

Accordingly,

there was no error in denying appellant's requested
instruction since its substance was included in the selfdefense instructions actually given.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT ON REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESIS.
At trial, the appellant requested that the jury
be given the following instruction on reasonable

altern~

tive hypothesis:
To warrant you in convicting the defendant, the evidence must to your
minds exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than that of the guilt of
the defendant.
That is to say, if
after an entire consideration and comparison of all the testimony in the
case you can reasonably explain the
facts given in evidence on any reasonable ground other than the guilt of
the defendant, you should acquit him.
(R. 52,53)
This court explained the rationale behind such
jury instructions in State v. Garcia, 11 Utah 2d 67, 355
P.2d 57 (1960), where it stated:
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[We) have held that where the only
proof of material fact or one
which is a necessary element of
defendant's guilt consists of circumstantial evidence, such circumstances must reasonably preclude
every hypothesis of defendant's
innocence. An instruction to this
effect in an appropriate situation
would be proper but this requires
care to use language which the jury
would understand and which would not
merely lend to their confusion.
We must keep in mind that this
rule is applicable only where proof
of a.material ~ssue ~s based solely
on circumstantial evidence.
355 P.2d at 59-60.

(Emphasis added.)

See also State v. Bender, 581 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1978); State v.
Fort, 572 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1977).
The rule requiring a reasonable alternative hypothesis
instruction is clearly inapplicable to a case such as the
present where both direct and circumstantial evidence
establishing appellant's guilt was presented.

In this case,

two eyewitness accounts of the events leading up to the death
of Joe Boykin were submitted to the jury.

This testimony

established appellant's role in causing Boykin's death and
also constituted direct evidence from which other elements
of the crime, such as intent, could be inferred.
~.

554 P. 2d 216, 219

State v.

(Utah 1976).

Appellant contends that it was error to deny.his
request for an instruction on reasonable alternative hypothesis,
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claiming that the evidence of intent in the present case
was wholly circumstantial and subject to alternative conclusions.

Appellant further contends that there is a

danger that in the absence of such an instruction the jury
would not understand that if there were another explanation
for defendant's conduct giving rise to a reasonable doubt
as to his guilt, he should be acquitted.
Respondent contends that is was not error to deny
the requested instruction.

It is well established that inte::
I

can generally be presumed from other evidence produced at tr.:
trial.

This court recognized the value of making reason~k

1

inferences from proven facts in State v. Peterson, 22 Utah 1:
377, 453 P. 2d 696

(1969).

The defendant in that case was

convicted of assault with a deadly weapon with the inte~tt
do bodily harm.

On appeal, defendant contended the intent

t:

do bodily harm was not sufficiently established by the proV€:
fact that defendant made a slashing motion toward his victi:
with a hunting knife, injuring the victim's hand.

This c~r

affirmed the conviction, stating:
It is true that the State was unable to
prove directly what was in the defen?an~'s
mind relative to doing harm to the victim;
and that he in fact denied having any such
intent.
However, this version does not
establish the fact, nor does it even necessarily raise sufficient doubt to initiate
the conviction.
If it were so, it would
lie within the power of a defendant to
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1

defeat practically any conviction which
dep~nded upon his state of mind.
As
ag~i~st what he says, it is the jury's
privilege to weigh and consider all of
the other facts and circumstances shown
in ~vidence ~n determining what they will
believe. This includes not only what was
said and what was done, but also the conduct shown, which in this instance they
may well have regarded as speaking louder
than the defendant's later defensive
claims as to what his intentions were.
22 Utah 2d at 378, 453 P.2d at 697.
Appellant's contention that an instruction on
reasonable alternative hypothesis was necessary because
appellant's intent was established by reasonable inferences
based upon facts shown by direct evidence is totally without
merit.

This Court treated a similar situation in State v.

Hopkins, 11 Utah 2d 363, 359 P.2d 486 (1961).

In Hopkins,

the defendant was convicted of Second Degree Burglary
involving the entry of a second story apartment.

The evidence

of defendant's guilt included the fact that he matched a
witnesses' description of one of two men she saw climbing a
ladder outside the window, and the fact that one defendant's
shoes and his car were found in the vicinity.

The defendant

at first denied entering the apartment, then admitted that he
had been present.

However, the defendant claimed he had

picked up a stranger, had driven him home for $2.00 gas money,
and later helped him enter the apartment.

The defendant

argued that since there was no direct proof that he entered
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with the intent to commit larceny, he was entitled to
acquittal under the rule that where circumstantial evidence
is relied upon to establish guilt, the evidence must exc~~
every other reasonable hypothesis.

This Court affirmed the

conviction, stating:
The difficulty with defendant's position
is that the rule he relies on is not
applicable where . . • there is dispute
in the evidence and one version thereof
does not support his thesis.
He errs in
assuming that the jury was obliged to
believe his story as to what happened
and why he entered the apartment. The
fact that after being caught in the crossfire of his wife's identification of the
shoes, he admitted that he had falsified
about them and about being in the apartment,
and made an explanation which seemed
reasonable to him, and inconsistent with
his guilt, does not mean that the jury
had to so believe.
It was their exclusive
prerogative to judge the credit to be
given the evidence and to determine the
facts.
It is to be remembered that intent, being
a state of mind, is rarely susceptible of
direct proof, but it can be inferred from
conduct and attendant circumstances in the
light of human behavior and experience.
359 P.2d at 487.
In the present case the testimony of two eye-witne'
provided ample direct evidence of appellant's actions from
which the requisite intent to support the jury's verdictof
· f erre d .
Manslaughter could be in

Appellant, on the other ha~..

contends that the evidence was also susceptible of the altC
hypothesis that appellant was acting in self-defense, as
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discussed under the preceding two points, evidence tending
to support the appellant's theory of self-defense was presented at trial and the jury was adequately instructed in
the law applicable to a claim of self-defense, making an
instruction on reasonable alternative hypothesis unnecessary.
It was the jury's prerogative to reach its conclusions based upon the evidence adduced at trial.

Accordingly,

the jury concluded that appellant was not justified in using
deadly force against Boykin.

This conclusion is supported

by appellant's own testimony which showed he did not act in
the reasonable belief that deadly force was necessary to
protect himself or another from serious deadly harm.

Appellant

admitted that Boykin did not threaten him verbally or through
gestures (R. 344-345); that although Boykin had his hand
in his pocket, appellant did not see any bulge in the pocket
(R. 333) and that appellant wondered before the shooting why
Boykin had not removed the suspected weapon from his pocket
(R. 340).

Thus, direct evidence from the appellant's testimony

showed that he did not act under a reasonable belief of
imminent danger and, accordingly, he was not entitled to his
claimed defense of self-defense.
Appellant further contends that failure to give the
requested instruction could result in confusion as to the
State's burden of proof.

Appellant claims that without
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instruction on reasonable alternative hypothesis, the jur
could conclude that appellant had the burden of proof of
establishing his defense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Cons:

ering the jury instructions actually given, there is no
possibility that the jury could have misunderstood the
burden of proof.

~t

The jury was instructed upon the prosecu:

burden where a defendant pleads not guilty (instruction nu:.
3, R. 7 6) , the presumption of innocence (instruction

numbe~

R. 8 5) and the need to find guilt beyond a reasonable dout:
as related to the specific crimes of Second Degree Murder
(instruction number 15, R. 87) and Manslaughter ( instructic
number 17, R. 90).

In addition, jury instruction numberl:

specifically applied the reasonable doubt standard to self·
defense.

This instruction read:
You are instructed that the laws of Utah
do not require a defendant to establish
self-defense by a preponderance or greater
weight of the evidence. The laws of Utah
require the defendant to bring forward
some substantial evidence which tends to
show self-defense.
If the defendant has
done this, and if such evidence of selfdefense when considered in connection with
all other evidence in this case raises a
reasonable doubt as to the defendant's
guilt or if it raises a reasonable doubt
as to whether or not the defendant acted
in self-defense you must acquit him of
the charges .

(R.

95)

The effect of this instruction would be to

a~~

confusion as to the burden of proof applicable in the pre"
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case.

Furthermore, this Court observed in its recent

decision in State v. Eagle, No 16189 (Utah Sup.Ct. filed
May 6, 1980), that "the reasonable alternative hypo~hesis
instruction is merely one way of expressing [the) necessary
burden of proof and there is no apparent reason to mandate
that one, and only one, particular instruction be used . .
in conveying to the jury the meaning of . . . 'proof beyond
a reasonable doubt.'"
In the present case, the jury was clearly and
adequately informed of the legal standards to be applied to
appellant's claim of self-defense and the relative burdens
placed upon the State and appellant.

Accordingly, the trial

court committed no error in refusing appellant's requested
instruction on reasonable alternative hypothesis.
POINT IV
THERE IS NO CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF
ERRORS JUSTIFYING A REVERSAL IN
THE INSTANT CASE.
The doctrine announced in State v. St. Clair, 3
Utah 2d 230, 282 P.2d 323 (1955), that in some instances
errors, which when standing alone would not justify reversal,
may have such a cumulative effect so as to deprive the accused
of a fair trial, is not disputed by respondent.

However,

respondent submits that the instant case does not meet the
cciteria set forth in State v. St. Clair, supra.

The duty of
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the appellant is set forth at 3 Utah 2d 244:
[I)f the court can say with assurance
that the evidence of the defendants'
guilt was so clear and convincing that
no reasonable jury could be expected to
return a different verdict, even in the
absence of the irregularities, then the
errors would be harmless and the verdict
should be permitted to stand. On the
other hand, if there is reasonable
likelihood that in the absence of the
errors a different verdict might have
been rendered, a new trial should be
granted.
(Emphasis added.)
In the instant case there is no cumulation of em
which would justify a conclusion that a different verdict
would have been reached by the jury in the absence of such
errors.

In State v. St. Clair, supra, the cumulation of er:

supported this court's finding that it was reasonably like!:
the verdict of the jury would have been different but for f
errors.

However, the alleged errors in the instant case do

not justify such a conclusion.
To conclude that a cumulation of errors has prec!
appellant from having a fair trial first necessitates a
clusion that errors were committed.

c~

Respondent submits tha:

no errors were committed by the trial court in the present
case, and therefore, State v. St. Clair, supra, is clearly
distinguishable
Respondent submits that this court should foll~
State v. Sinclair, 15 Utah 2d 162, 389 P.2d 465 (1964),
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wherein it is stated at 15 Utah 2d 170:
Under our statute [Utah Code Ann.
77-42-1 (1953)), which requires that
errors which do not affect the essential
rights of the parties be disregarded, we
cann~t properly interfere with the jury's
verdict, unless upon a review of the whole
case it should appear that there was error
o~ sufficient gravity that the defendant's
rights were prejudiced in some substantial
way.
We have found nothing of any such
consequence here.
(Emphasis added.)
§

Respondent submits that a review of the whole record
requires a conclusion that the appellant received a fair trial
and that no error was committed that prejudiced appellant in
a substantial way.
CONCLUSION
The trial court did not commit error in instructing
the jury in the statutory definition of self-defense where
the instruction was supported by a reasonable interpretation
of the evidence.

The court also correctly refused to give to

the jury appellant's requested instruction concerning past
violent acts of the deceased since the instructions actually
given allowed the jury to consider these facts.
Finally, the appellant was not entitled to an
instruction on reasonable alternative hypothesis where there
was sufficient direct evidence establishing his guilt and
forming the basis for reasonable inferences from his actions.
Based upon this argument and the foregoing citation
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of authority, respondent respectfully urges this Court
to affirm the judgment and sentence of the court below.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
ROBERT R. WALLACE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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